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... e altri 65 articoli
Collegamenti: banche (41) banchecentrali (6) economia dell'orrore (10) finanza (12) mutui (4)
The OTC derivatives market allows for the establishment of contractual obligations between financial institutions that may be impossible to satisfy, even in principle. In particular, OTC derivatives allow for the creation of a "pyramid" of financial promises that cannot possibly be satisfied because the amount to be paid, in certain states of the world, is larger than the value of total world wealth in those same states of the world. Call this point 1.
In models where individual portfolios are fully observable, beliefs over future states of the world are common (or, at least, they have a common support) and markets are dynamically complete, the situation conjectured in point 1 is impossible. This is because either B, before beginning to tango, will be able to correctly assess A's creditworthiness in all future states of the world and make sure it holds enough net real assets to back its promises to pay, or the rising costs that A faces in financing its portfolio positions will force it to diversify away its risk until the previous condition is in fact met, i.e. A has enough real equities to pay for its derivative commitments in case those come due and X (i.e. shit, for those that just tuned in) happens. Because economic theorists studying financial markets almost always assume these conditions to be satisfied, the fear that point 1 raises in the layman was not shared, until now, by financial economists.[...] the hedge-fund operators [read: investment bankers] and others [fill in the name of your preferred banker] may earn perfectly enormous incomes. (Margaret Blair of the Brookings Institution was one of the first to point this out.) If they are clever enough, and they are, they can arrange their compensation packages so that they batten on profits and are shielded from losses.
This is because, in the actual financial environment of USA 2001-2008,
(pseudo) profits from derivatives came earlier - when interest rates
were low, hence expected default rates were low - and (very real)
losses came later - when interest rates increased, hence actual default
rates also did - and had to be absorbed by the little capital left in
the firm, which was not enough. The actual capital reserves had been
taken out by calling them "profits". This is point 3 again, only shortened.
Because it is late, I hope it is now clear why it took the convergence
of all three contingencies, summarized as points 1, 2 and 3, for this
disaster to happen. Any two of them without the third would have not, I
believe, caused the big mess we are currently into.
In this sense this is an "exceptional event", and it needs not imply the "end of capitalism". But, in an another sense, it is and was a perfectly predictable event: various people wiser than myself (e.g. Mr. Warren Buffett) had pretty much predicted it a few years back. We, the academic economists, were blind to the facts and did not see it happening because we assumed the deviations of reality from our "standard model" to be quantitatively small. We were mostly wrong, and a few wiser people were right. More than anything, though, I believe we did not see that the particular nature of derivative contracts (their being "zero sum games, if no one cheats") together with the private information that plagues the OTC derivative markets allowed for gigantic (pseudo) profits-taking of funds that were, according to the theory and should have been in fact, capital reserves that had to be "left in the firm" to serve until the life of the derivative contract. But derivative contracts, these misterious zero net supply securities, allow for redistributing wealth from B to A at points in time that preceed their expiration, and redistributing to oneself very large sums of money (in a perfectly "legal" way) is a temptation no one can easily resist. Investment bankers may not be wizards, as they often portray themselves, but they are certainly humans.
Quite correctly bygones are bygones and, in the unlikely event this analysis will be found convincing, it still does not tell us what to do NOW given the current circumstances. In particular, should we go the way that Bernanke and Paulson are pushing us to go? Is there another and better way? I am not sure, but I believe a narrow but clear other way can be found on the basis of this analysis and similar ones developed by other. To the issue of "WHAT TO DO NOW" I hope to turn soon in the third part of these thoughts.
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It would be good to start part III by briefly describing what would happen if the US Gov does not intervene.
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I admit that I have carefully read only the first part of the story. The have had only a quick look at the second part. I have the impression that Michele is partially missing the main point.
The core of the picture that he is outlining is that OTC derivatives are the main culprits for what is currently happening. Surely he knows that he is not the only one supporting this argument. I remember that George Soros and, in Italy, Guido Rossi were also blaming the size of OTC derivative market (OTC Credit Default Swaps on the top). They say: derivatives are non trasparent and allow dealers to cheat (each other ? or the public opinion ?). I dare say that the first point has been already addressed by OTC derivative dealer since several years through collateral agreements. The counterparties of OTC deals agree to check jointly, on a daily basis, the evaluation of the contracts they have traded (note that these contracts are not all long or all short but somewhat balanced) and the one which is net debtor will provide some cash collateral in order to mitigate counterparty (i.e. credit) risk. In case two dealers are pricing the same contract in two different ways they have a strong incentive to check their pricing models.
OTC derivatives look much like a scapegoat rather than a culprit. The current crisis is mainly related to something else: asset backed securities and the like (which in their more sophisticated forms include derivative components as well). Together with leverage well beyond safe levels. What were doing regulators in the meanwhile ? Looking at the bright side (conspicuos profits that banks were gaining until one a half year ago, you know money is always right). What were doing rating agencies ? Making money through commissions generated by new and new issues of ABSs (that were eventually repackaged into new things and new ABS backed securities). Where did rating agencies indipendency go ? Gone (at a fair price though). Almost everybody was on board. Well, a proper explanation require much more time and words. But this is the substance.
What else ? The main director of the bailout is going to be Mr. Paulson. Actually it seems they are deciding to give the key of the stable to the wolf himself. No doubt he is a smart guy. No doubt about who he will favour when facing the choice between taxpayer interest and Wall Street (i.e. Goldman Sachs) interest. I suppose that in comparison the well known conflict of interest of Mr. Silvio Berlusconi will pale. One question arise. If the money of all can be used to back heavily a few, what can be said when the most will try to seize the richness of the few ?
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We essentially agree, Amadeus, but let me try to clarify in three steps.
First, I agree with you that,
The current crisis is mainly related to something else: asset backed securities and the like (which in their more sophisticated forms include derivative components as well). Together with leverage well beyond safe levels. What were doing regulators in the meanwhile ? Looking at the bright side (conspicuos profits that banks were gaining until one a half year ago, you know money is always right). What were doing rating agencies ? Making money through commissions generated by new and new issues of ABSs (that were eventually repackaged into new things and new ABS backed securities). Where did rating agencies indipendency go ? Gone (at a fair price though). Almost everybody was on board. Well, a proper explanation require much more time and words. But this is the substance.
I thought this is what my example and all the "violations of the standard model" I describe are meant to say. If, after all those words, I did not succeed, I should reconsider my writing.
BUT, and this is the second point, without the use of a very large amount of OTC derivatives ($60 trilion only in CDSs) the whole packaging and siphoning around of ABSs would have been much harder, if not impossible. First because a lot of that took place in the form of derivatives and, second and more important, because all the (pseudo, ex-post) insuring of the underlying risk would have been impossibile.
Finally, and it is my third, without the "smart pricing" of derivatives, the economically unjustified "profits taking" activity that has turned the now so needed capital reserves into mansions in the Hamptons, airplanes and trophy wifes, would have been impossible. And most of the collapses we are witnessing would have not happened.
I am not trying to make the OTC market the culprit of the whole story! Far from me. When I write that all three conditions are needed for such a mess to happen, I strictly mean it: what a triple witch decade this is!
Finally, one must accept that some observations are correct even if they force us to agree with characters we do not find particularly admirable, e.g. Mr. Soros. You mention all these good measures taken on the OTC markets: correct. Still, after the fact it is easy to see that they must have been pretty ineffective if hundred of billions in CDS contracts are being defaulted upon. Evidently the various parties had not carefully and daily checked the credit worthiness of the various counterparties, no? Again, the OTC market is not the culprit but it is hard to deny it is one of them.
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OTC derivatives look much like a scapegoat rather than a culprit. The current crisis is mainly related to something else: asset backed securities and the like (which in their more sophisticated forms include derivative components as well). Together with leverage well beyond safe levels. What were doing regulators in the meanwhile ? Looking at the bright side (conspicuos profits that banks were gaining until one a half year ago, you know money is always right). What were doing rating agencies ? Making money through commissions generated by new and new issues of ABSs (that were eventually repackaged into new things and new ABS backed securities). Where did rating agencies indipendency go ? Gone (at a fair price though). Almost everybody was on board. Well, a proper explanation require much more time and words. But this is the substance.
Gia', ma la colpa a ben guardare non e' neppure loro:
- Le rating agencies facevano quello che uno si aspetta da ogni entita' privata, cioe' massimizzare i profitti per il loro azionisti: fidarsene come se fossero imparziali e' da ingenui se fatto da investitori privati, e pura follia se fatto da istituzioni pubbliche come la BIS (su questo, vedi l'opinione che esprimevo poco piu' di un anno fa).
- I regolatori, poi, facevano quello che gli era stato detto di fare, guardando al proprio cortile e ignorando quello accanto. Ad esempio, se la FED per statuto non era responsabile per la supervisione ne' delle banche d'investimento ne' delle assicurazioni come AIG (o MBIA e Ambac, altri disastri in attesa di succedere di cui ora tutti sembrano essersi dimenticati), non le si puo' far carico di essersi addormentata al volante.
Le responsabilita' semmai ricadono su chi definisce i compiti e i poteri dei regolatori, cioe' dei rappresentanti democraticamente eletti a Presidenza e Congresso: i quali in questi giorni, sia a destra che a sinistra, si atteggiano invece ad autentici difensori del pubblico interesse nello stile del capitano Renault di Casablanca ("I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!", salvo intascare un secondo dopo i proventi delle sue vincite - are you listening, Robert "Citi" Rubin?).
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I'll write this in my laughable Italian. Apologies. Ovviamente qualcosa va fatto per evitare il disastro del sistema finanziario americano, ci sono due aspetti che però trovo in un certo senso divertenti:
1) Il piano del Tesoro, per quello che ne capisce, prevede che il congresso firmi un assegno in bianco al Ministro delle Finanze (che come avete ricordato è un ex Goldman Sachs). A confronto, l'intervento per salvare Alitalia sembra essere ispirato da Von Hayek. Nella 'socialista' Unione Europea un intervento di stato di questo tipo non sarebbe mai stato ammesso anche perchè, a occhio, fa a cazzotti col potere di controllo che il Parlamento dovrebbe avere col Governo.
2) Dopo i ripetuti salvataggi di istituzioni finanziarie il rischio sovrano degli Stati Uniti è aumentato: di conseguenza il prezzo delle obbligazioni pubbliche già emesse scenderà. Dato che una parte consistente del debito estero statunitense è finanziato da acquisti esteri di obbligazioni e azioni, la discesa dei prezzi dei treasuries, unita al deprezzamento del dollaro e alla caduta dei prezzi di borsa, equivale a un parziale default del debito estero.
Se ci pensate, tutto questo è tipicamente americano, se solo si considera la parte di continente a Sud del Rio Grande: lì i Governi intervenivano (e in parte inteverngono ancora ) massicciamente nell'economia passando sopra al parlamento, e ogni tanto, quanto la situazione va fuori controllo, decidono di non pagare più di debiti. Bienvenidos a Latinoamerica, queridos Yanquis!
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can't wait for the third episode.
[now, if michele was a seasoned pusher he would charge us for the third part. i claim intellectual property rights on this idea, hence sharing of profits if implemented]
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A me sembra di essere tornato all'Università , grazie Michele per avermi tolto vent'anni in un colpo solo, anche il racconto a puntate mi ha ricordato il mio professore di Economia Politica (Mariano D'Antonio, Keynesiano, da sei mesi assessore "tecnico" nella Giunta Regionale Campana di Bassolino, attento Michele, è una fine che non auguro a nessuno), che arrivato sul più bello ci diceva: "il resto a domani e studiatevi la curva di domanda !"
Attendo le tue conclusioni, le mie per quel che valgono sono: salvare F&F ed il resto che vada in malora ! Tra l'altro concordo con Oronzo Canà (il proprio nome no?) che tutti quelli che hanno titoli del Tesoro Americano rischiano una bella svalutazione, ma non è la prima volta che gli USA fanno pagare ad altri i propri debiti.
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Oggi alcuni benestanti amerikani hanno ricevuto questo messaggio di e-mail. L'ho ricevuto anche io, purtroppo ... Che sia spam?
From: Minister of the Treasury Paulson Subject: REQUEST FOR URGENT CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP Dear American: I need to ask you to support an urgent secret business relationship with a transfer of funds of great magnitude. I am Ministry of the Treasury of the Republic of America. My country has had crisis that has caused need for large transfer of funds of 700 billion dollars US. If you would assist me in this transfer, it would be most profitable to you. I am working with Mr. Phil Gramm, lobbyist for UBS, who will be my replacement as Ministry of the Treasury in January. As a Senator, you may know him as the leader of the American banking deregulation movement in the 1990s. This transactin is 100% safe. This is a matter of great urgency. We need blank check. We need funds as quickly as possible. We cannot directly transfer funds in the names of our close friends because we are constantly under surveillance. My family lawyer advised me that I should look for reliable and trustworthy person who will act as a next of kin so funds can be transferred. Please reply with all of your bank account, IRA and college fund account numbers and those of your children and grandchildren to wallstreetbailout@treasury.gov so that we may transfer your commission for this transaction. After I receive confirmation of transfer, I will respond with detailed information about safeguards that will be used to protect the funds. Yours Faithfully Minister of Treasury Paulson
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... ma temo che verra' trattata come tale dal signore che ha inviato la precedente. Io, comunque, l'ho firmata, assieme a molti altri colleghi ...
To the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate: As economists, we want to express to Congress our great concern for the plan proposed by Treasury Secretary Paulson to deal with the financial crisis. We are well aware of the difficulty of the current financial situation and we agree with the need for bold action to ensure that the financial system continues to function. We see three fatal pitfalls in the currently proposed plan: 1) Its fairness. The plan is a subsidy to investors at taxpayers'expense. Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. Not every business failure carries "systemic risk." The government can ensure a well-functioning financial industry, able to make new loans to creditworthy borrowers, without bailing out particular investors and institutions whose choices proved unwise. 2) Its ambiguity. Neither the mission of the new agency nor its oversight are clear. If taxpayers are to buy illiquid and opaque assets from troubled sellers, the terms, occasions, and methods of such purchases must be crystal clear ahead of time and carefully monitored afterwards. 3) Its long-term effects. If the plan is enacted, its effects will be with us for a generation. For all their recent troubles, America's dynamic and innovative private capital markets have brought the nation unparalleled prosperity. Fundamentally weakening those markets in order to calm short-run disruptions is desperately short-sighted. For these reasons we ask Congress not to rush, to hold appropriate hearings, and to carefully consider the right course of action. The manifest intention to intervene has already calmed the markets and given us all the opportunity to wisely determine the future of the financial industry and the U.S. economy for years to come.
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Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. Not every business failure carries “systemic risk”.
Bisognerebbe spiegarlo anche a chi, nella terra di Pantalone, va cianciando di risarcimenti ai cosiddetti "piccoli investitori .....
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e un po' l'ideologia...
Ideologia? Quale ideologia? It is economic SCIENCE my friend, science!
Scherzi a parte, credo che conti piu' il networking in questo caso anche se in Cambridge (MA) avranno paura di firmare per non apparire troppo free markets. Senno', la prossima volta che vogliono un'altra bella iniezione di moneta "to jolt the economy" e creare un'altro be disastro come questo, corrono il rischio che qualcuno glielo ricordi ... ok, time to find time to write down my plan!
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mi lascia piuttosto indifferente. "Bisognerebbe discutere di piu, riflettere meglio..." BAH! Nessuna proposta tecnica concreta, che invece aiuterebbe.
I congressisti farebbero meglio di smetterla di proporre amendamenti che non servono, cestinare la lettera e ascoltare qualcuno che veramente se ne intende:
BN 8:11 *BUFFETT CALLS PAULSON PLAN `ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY' :BRK/A US
BN 8:11 *BUFFETT: MARKET COULDN'T HAVE TAKEN ANOTHER WEEK LIKE LAST ONE
BN 8:14 *BUFFETT: MORE INACTION AND LAST WEEK WILL LOOK LIKE `NIRVANA'
BN 8:14 *BUFFETT SAYS `IT'LL GET WORSE' IF PAULSON PLAN DROPPED
e sopratutto questa:
BN 8:38 *BUFFETT SAYS U.S. DOESN'T HAVE LUXURY OF THINKING FOR 3 WEEKS
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L'opinione di Warren Buffett in materia di finanza e investimenti va sempre rispettata, ma in questo caso potrebbe non essere del tutto disinteressata. Quando si hanno grosse somme investite in banche e altre imprese del settore finanziario, la prospettiva può non essere strettamente quella del benessere pubblico.
Io credo che il Congresso ascolterà l'appello degli economisti per una discussione lunga ma non per una discussione attenta, e lo farà out of self-interest. Il tema della crisi finanziaria mette chiaramente a disagio l'establishment repubblicano e la campagna presidenziale di McCain; un po' anche i democratici, a dir la verità, ma almeno stando ai polls è chiaro che il prezzo più salato in termini di consenso lo stanno pagando i repubblicani. I Democrats hanno quindi interesse a che il tema resti nelle news il più a lungo possibile. Aiuta il loro candidato alla presidenza e aiuta direttamente congressmen e senatori che sono up for re-election a novembre, soprattutto quelli di distretti elettorali potenzialmente ''swing''.
Conclusione: siccome sono i democratici ad avere la maggioranza sia alla camera dei deputati sia al senato, aspettatevi un luuuuungo dibattito sul bailout, condito da poco buonsenso e tanto populismo stile ''wall street ci succhia il sangue'' da parte dei democratici. I repubblicani, come hanno sempre fatto almeno dopo l'11 settembre, cercheranno invece di seppellire qualunque discussione urlando che la situazione è urgente, che ne va della sicurezza nazionale, e che occorre dare poteri dittatoriali al governo sennó arriva il babau e ci mangia tutti. In questo ambiente, come italiano, io mi sentirò un pochino più a casa.
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L'opinione di Warren Buffett in materia di finanza e investimenti va sempre rispettata, ma in questo caso potrebbe non essere del tutto disinteressata. Quando si hanno grosse somme investite in banche e altre imprese del settore finanziario, la prospettiva può non essere strettamente quella del benessere pubblico.
Gia'. Gli addetti ai lavori stanno cominciando a commentare l'operazione di Buffett. Bottom line:
Vote of Confidence my ass . . .
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Il politico pensera', leggendo quella lettera, che il gotha dell'economia poteva anche svegliarsi prima (*). Non voglio essere sarcastico, solo cinico, considerato quale e' l'opinione che la politica ha dell'economia negli ultimi anni (le dichiarazioni di McCain e Clinton tra le ultime). E c'e' da dire che su questo argomento il politico la trova facile, nonostante il fatto che l'opinione pubblica sia effettivamente infuriata.
Un paio di considerazioni.
La prima: tra il dissenso generale che ho visto al piano del bailout, questa di imitare la svezia mi sembra, da ignorante, l'unica cosa che si avvicina ad una proposta alternativa.
La seconda: il diritto di comprare cio' che vuole quando vuole e' stato dato non a Paulson, ma al ministero del tesoro. Paulson a Gennaio se ne va. Chissa' chi arriva. Si danno poteri che in molti definiscono anticostituzionali a qualcuno che ancora nemmeno si sa chi sia.
(*) anche se, ragionando con lo stesso cinismo, dubito sarebbe servito a qualcosa fare le cassandre.
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Mi sembra che almeno uno dei firmatari abbia effettivamente fatto delle proposte alternative:
http://www.voxeu.com/index.php?q=node/1670
La richiesta di assegnare al governo dei diritti di proprietà in cambio degli aiuti (parzialmente ispirata al modello svedese e al caso recente di N. Rock) comincia a prendere piede. In realtà dato il clima da "ultima spiaggia" che si sta creando (o stanno creando) dovrebbe discendere logicamente che il piano potrebbe avere anche delle importanti esternalità positive, anche per coloro che non aderiranno (a meno che nessuno aderisca nella speranza che lo facciano gli altri...) o no avranno una stretta necessità di aderire. Trattasi di un interessante gioco strategico per chi se ne intende. Anche i beneficiari indiretti saranno chiamati a versare il loro obolo ?!?
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Segnalo questo articolo di Mario Seminerio che trovo "abbastanza" sconvolgente, esp. per quanto riguarda l'Europa.
Vedi anche quest'articolo di Daniel Gros e Stefano Micossi, pubblicato in inglese anche sul Financial Times.
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Copio e incollo dal sito www.electoral-vote.com. Devo dire che l'esatta indicazione di ''bailouts of private institutions'' è impressionante. Che un partito faccia cose diverse da quelle dette nel programma non è così strano, nemmeno negli Stati Uniti, ma che lo faccia addirittura in campagna elettorale lascia un po' interdetti.
The Republican Party platform adopted 3 weeks ago explicitly opposes government bailouts of private companies. Here is the exact quote (from the section "Rebuilding Homeownership"):
We do not support government bailouts of private institutions. Government interference in the markets exacerbates problems in the marketplace and causes the free market to take longer to correct itself. We believe in the free market as the best tool to sustained prosperity and opportunity for all.
This plank in the GOP platform is not controversial within the party. Republicans have always believed that when companies make bad business decisions the market will punish them and this is the deterrence for future companies to think through their decisions carefully. The problem now is the utter hypocrisy of throwing overboard a principle Republicans have held dear for a century. If (big) companies lose the fear of bankruptcy because they expect the government to bail them out, they will take unconscionable risks in the future. Maybe somebody should send Henry Paulson a copy of the Republican platform.
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Maybe this is a little offtopic, but when I read point 3 I think about all the news about local italian governments making heavy use of derivatives.With little changes, the short version might become:
[...] the hedge-fund operators [read: mayors and governors] and others [fill in the name of your preferred banker] may earn [spend] perfectly enormous incomes [amounts]. (Margaret Blair of the Brookings Institution was one of the first to point this out.) If they are clever enough, and they are, they can arrange their compensation packages so that they batten on profits and are shielded from losses [which will come after the end of their mandate].
I'm not sure if point 1 and 2 hold in this case, but my guess is that 1 does and 2 might be replaced by the implicit state warranty on local debt.
Should we expect a similar scenario in our local governments?
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And who will back up a bankrupt central government no matter how stupid, incompetent dishonest and corrupt it is?
We have seen how financial crises in relatively tiny economies have rippled through other developing markets. If there is a financial tidal wave of American proportions, it seems to me that the Italian debt sand castle is the closest to shore.
But this is not my field. If someone more knowledgable can discuss the contagion risk for us, it would be very much appreciated.
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"Contagion", or whatever you want to call the fact that X in country A holds assets/liabilities against Y in country B) has little to do, if anything, with the size of either country A or B. It just depends upon having or not having closed/open financial markets and capital mobility.
In this specific case, I am afraid, the size of the country counts little. Dozens, hundreds, of hedge funds and other financial institutions seat in micro countries like Bahamas, Andorra, Liechtenstein and so on. Short of having one currency and one central bank for each small country (and closed capital markets on top of it) the two things are completely unrelated.
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Let me chew on it.
I just want to make sure we talk about the same size. I understand that just because there is a crisis in a big (GDP) country like the US does not mean other big countries (France, Germany) are automatically at risk.
But if Uncle Sam decides to pull out his credit card, which is already stretched out, to help out within his household, it seems that it might have an impact on other countries struggling with hefty credit card bills.
I mean, it's not the first time Italy had a collapse. In 1992 the Lira was pegged to an overly strong Mark (German policy toward East Germany, etc...), it faced a recession (like now?), and the world economy was feeling the impact of a US real estate crisis (remember D.Trump being po' at the time?), kind of like now. And for the astrologers (but this is just a coincidental parallel), even then there was a Bush president fighting a war in Iraq.
Back then the Lira got a spanking, but right now the presence of the Euro makes things a bit harder to undestand (for me). I just wonder if having this fragile Italian situation "pegged" to this strong Euro is not worsening the situation and delaying the inevitable, kind of like Argentina pegged to the strong $.
I don't know, but a weak growth (if not negative), rising inflation, and potentially rising rates, is a recepy for trouble ahead for a highly indebted "entity".
Am I wrong?
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No idea. I do not even understand what you say, frankly.
Tradotto: non so se hai torto o ragione. Non capisco neanche cosa sostieni, e non credo sia l'inglese.
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Non so neppure io se ho torto o ragione.
Quello che voglio dire e' che spesso gli economisti si concentrano a spiegare quello che e' successo (cosa molto importante), ma tante volte non si sentono (o non vengono ascoltati) avvertire di un pericolo imminente.
Ora, io non sono in grado di quantificare nessuna previsione (non sono un esperto di mercati finanziari), e forse mi sono fatto spaventare da Bush che rassicurava sull'FDIC. Pero' mi chiedevo che impatto potesse avere sull'Euorpa (e in particolare sull'Italia) quest'ultima crisi.
Forse la risposta e' niente di che, pero' se c'e' qualcuno che se ne intende e ha dei numeri per fare qualche previsione per quanto riguarda la situazione italiana, sarebbe interessante.
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I've seen that episode, but I don't trust them when they talk about this kind of stuff, and for a good reason: they are even more clueless about economics than me.
In this case, they spent most of the time blaming the banks for selling a contract favorable to them, and local governors for buyng things they don't understand.While they do have a point here, they didn't even consider the other scenario, where the governor knows it's a bad business for the government but a good one for himself.And I'm pretty positive that both events do happen in real life.
I do trust report on the field work to collect the facts, not on the analisys.
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Caro Michele, davvero complimenti. Chiaro ed esauriente, come al solito, anzi più del solito. Solo due brevi commenti:
1. non mi pare di aver letto nel tuo post che le decisioni della Fed sul tasso di interesse sono prese guardando anche (soprattutto?) all'economia reale, non solo alla pura finanza dei derivatives. Questo spiega perché può verificarsi una politica monetaria che oggettivamente si trova prima ad edificare e poi (doverosamente?) a bruciare la gigantesca piramide di carta che così bene descrivi. L'inevitabile doppio ruoli della liquidità, ovvero finanziare l'economia reale delle equities e alimentare la piramide dei derivatives, è a mio avviso un aspetto essenziale della questione.
2. le tue ammissioni sul "fallimento" degli economisti ti fanno onore. Scherzando un po', potrei chiederti se hai iniziato ad indossare calzini a pois e/o pensi di riciclarti come commercialista in Valtellina... Più seriamente, mi piacerebbe una discussione con te ed altri (non in questo post, però) sulle responsabilità della formazione accademica degli operatori finanziari alla luce di tue affermazioni tipo:
Non credi che un po' più di storia economica (e magari anche di storia della teoria economica), e un po' meno di fancy math, avrebbe potuto insegnare qualcosa ai rampanti banchieri USA when still in their business school? Oppure, it's only a matter of regulation failure?